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FIFTH AMENDMENT-VALIDITY OF
WAIVER: A SUSPECT NEED NOT
KNOW THE SUBJECTS OF
INTERROGATION
Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Colorado v. Spring,1 the United States Supreme Court contin-
ued to narrowly construe the fifth amendment rights of a suspect
established in Miranda v. Arizona.2 In Spring, the Court found that
the traditional Miranda warnings are explicit as to their require-
ments and convey to the suspect "his constitutional privilege and
the consequences of abandoning" his rights.3 The Court held,
therefore, that "a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of
questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determin-
ing whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his fifth amendment privilege."'4 The Spring Court held that
the suspect's waiver of Miranda rights was not invalidated simply be-
cause the interrogating officers failed to inform the suspect that they
intended to question him about an unrelated murder.5
This Note examines the Spring decision and concludes that the
Supreme Court correctly held that Miranda does not require a sus-
pect to know all the possible subjects of questioning in order to
make a valid waiver of constitutional rights. The Spring Court, how-
ever, failed to adequately recognize and address the Miranda Court's
concerns for providing effective law enforcement and criminal pros-
ecution. This Note presents and discusses these policy concerns
and also addresses the question of whether police silence or nondis-
closure constitutes "trickery" within the meaning of Miranda.
6
1 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For an explanation of the application of the fifth amendment
in protecting the right against self-incrimination, see infra note 8 and accompanying
text.
3 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 859.
4 Id.
5 See id.
6 The Court in Miranda stated that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,




In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court sought to protect the suspect of
a crime from the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial in-
terrogation. 7 In an effort to minimize these pressures, the Court
established a set of proscribed warnings to inform a suspect of his
rights during a custodial interrogation.8 These warnings were in-
tended to act as a procedural safeguard for the suspect's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. 9
In Miranda, the Court also established that a suspect may waive
his fifth amendment rights, provided that his waiver is made "volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 10 In an effort to prevent the
protections of the Miranda warnings from becoming overly broad,
the Court has limited those instances in which a suspect's waiver will
be held to be invalid."1
Prior to the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the test for
determining the admissibility of a suspect's statement was the "vol-
untary test."' 2 Under this standard, the Court determined under a
waive his privilege." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). For a presentation
of the Miranda warnings, see infra note 8.
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
8 Id. The Miranda Court established that the prosecution cannot use a defendant's
statement obtained during a custodial interrogation unless the defendant has been
warned prior to questioning that he has "a right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he can not afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires." Id. at 479.
The Miranda Court based its decision on the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 439. The fifth amendment reads, in relevant part, that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
9 See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143 (1986). In Moran, Justice O'Connor
asserted that" 'the Miranda warnings are "not themselves rights protected by the Con-
stitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the [suspect's] right against compul-
sory self-incrimination [is] protected."' " Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))).
10 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1141, the Court
stated that a voluntary waiver is one which is "the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion or deception," and that a waiver must be made "with
a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it."
11 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (holding that the validity of a suspect's waiver of his
rights is not affected by a police failure to inform the suspect that his family had retained
counsel for him); Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (holding that the confes-
sion of a mentally ill defendant, properly advised of his Miranda rights, is valid); North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)(holding that an explicit statement by the suspect
is not invariably necessary to prove a proper waiver of his right to remain silent or his
right to counsel).
12 For examples of the Supreme Court's use of the voluntary test, see Hayness v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Rog-
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"totality of the circumstances" whether the suspect's confession and
statements were uncoerced and were the result of the suspect's free
will.13 However, as a result of the societal concerns presented in
Miranda, the Court established a set of proscribed warnings to be
provided to a suspect prior to a custodial interrogation as a prereq-
uisite for a valid waiver.
14
The Court, however, in adopting these procedural warnings,
did not completely abandon the "totality of the circumstances" re-
quirement. Currently, the Court examines the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights
to determine if his fifth amendment privilege was voluntarily
waived.' 5 As a result of the Court's decision in Miranda, much of the
attention and focus of the custodial interrogation analysis has
switched from an examination of the voluntariness of the suspect's
confession to an examination of the voluntariness of the suspect's
waiver.16
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SPRING
On March 30, 1979, John Leroy Spring was arrested for fire-
arms violations. 17 Spring was apprehended in Kansas City, Missouri
after an informant advised the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF) that Spring was engaged in the interstate transpor-
tation of stolen firearms.' 8 The informant also told the ATF agents
ers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). See also NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIA-
TION, CONFESSIONS AND INTERRROGATIONS AFTER MIRANDA: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDELINE OF THE LAw I (rev. 6th ed. 1978). For an explanation of the history of the
"voluntary test," see Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985).
13 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 266 (1985). See also Note, Fifth and
Sixth Amendments-Changing the Balance of Miranda, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666,
668 (1986).
14 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 268. See also Note, supra note 13, at 668.
15 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 268. See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141; Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75
(1979). Factors that the Court will consider in examining the totality of the circum-
stances include:
[T]he youth of the accused; his lack of education or low intelligence; the lack of any
advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of the detention; the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punish-
ment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
16 J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL, G. STARKMAN & W. BAUER, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 131 n.1 (3d ed. 1987). The question, however, of whether a suspect's
confession was voluntary cannot be ignored because it is possible to have "an effective
waiver of Miranda followed by police conduct which ma[kes] the subsequently given con-
fession involuntary." W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 264.
17 Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851, 853 (1987).
18 Id.
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that Spring and a companion had killed Donald Walker during a
hunting trip in Colorado.' 9 At the time the ATF agents received the
informant's information, however, Walker's body had not been dis-
covered nor had a report of Walker's disappearance been filed.20
Based on the informant's information, ATF agents set up an under-
cover operation to purchase firearms from Spring.21 The ATF
agents subsequently arrested Spring during an undercover
purchase.
22
At the time of Spring's arrest for the firearms violations, an
ATF agent advised Spring of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.23
At the ATF office in Kansas City, Spring was once again advised of
his Miranda rights and of his right to stop the questioning at any
time or to postpone the questioning until an attorney was present.
24
Spring, after signing a statement indicating that he understood his
rights and that he agreed to waive them, responded to the agents'
questioning. 2
5
The ATF agents initially questioned Spring about his firearms
transactions. 26 When the agents asked Spring if he had a criminal
record, Spring admitted to shooting his aunt when he was ten years
old. 27 When asked if he had ever shot anyone else, Spring lowered
his head and mumbled, "I shot another guy once." 28 Spring, how-
ever, denied shooting a man named Walker in Colorado or even
entering that state.29 At this point, the ATF agents ended their
19 Id. In February of 1979, Donald Walker went on a nighttime elk hunting trip with
John Spring and Donald Wagner near Craig, Colorado. People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865,
868 (Colo. 1985). Walker was asked to walk ahead of Spring and Wagner and search for
elk in a ravine next to the road. Id. at 868. As Walker moved ahead, Wagner asked
Spring to shine a flashlight in Walker's direction. Id. Wagner then fired a rifle shot at
Walker, striking Walker in the head. Id. Wagner walked to where Walker was laying on
the ground and fired a second shot which resulted in Walker's death. Id. At trial, Spring
admitted to helping Wagner bury Walker's body in the snow. Id. Spring testified, how-
ever, that he had no knowledge of Wagner's intent to kill Walker and that he had con-
cealed the murder only because he was afraid of Wagner. Id.
20 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 853. On March 22, 1979, Spring made statements to George
Dennison (the ATF informant) during a phone conversation recorded by the ATF
agents which indirectly referred to his participation in the Walker murder. People v.
Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 871 (Colo. 1985).
21 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 853.
22 Id.
23 Id. at n.1. For the content of the requisite Miranda warnings, see supra note 8.









On May 26, 1979, while Spring was in a Kansas City jail, Colo-
rado law enforcement agents questioned him.31 Prior to the ques-
tioning, the Colorado officers provided Spring with the requisite
Miranda warnings.32 Spring again signed a statement stating that he
understood his rights and that he wished to waive them.33 The of-
ficers informed Spring that they wanted to question him about the
Walker murder.34 Spring, stating that he "wanted to get it off his
chest," confessed to killing Walker.35 During the interrogation,
which lasted approximately one-and-one-half hours, Spring spoke
openly and freely, never requesting counsel nor indicating a desire
to stop the questioning.36 Spring subsequently edited and signed a
statement prepared by the Colorado authorities which summarized
the interview and his confession.
37
In a Colorado state trial court, Spring was charged with first-
degree murder.38 At trial, Spring attempted to have his statements
of March 30, 1979 and May 26, 1979 suppressed on the grounds
that the waiver of his rights under Miranda was invalid.39 The trial
30 Id.
31 Id. After the ATF agents completed their questioning of Spring in March of 1979,
the agents sent the results of their interrogation to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) so that the CBI could continue their independent investigation into the Walker
murder. People v. Spring, 671 P.2d 965, 967 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).







39 Id. Spring also moved to suppress a third statement which he made on July 13,
1979, after pleading guilty to the federal firearms charge and after an information charg-
ing him with the Walker murder had been issued in Colorado. Id. at 855 n.2.
On July 13, 1979, after being found guilty of the federal firearms charges, ATF
agents interviewed Spring in jail. People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 876 (Colo. 1985).
The agents told Spring that they had some questions concerning the weapons investiga-
tion. Id. The agents gave Spring the Miranda warnings, in response to which Spring
agreed to speak to the agents but refused to sign a written waiver form without consult-
ing an attorney. Id. The questioning covered a wide range of topics, including Spring's
involvement in the Walker murder. Id. During the course of the questioning, Spring
stated that the .22 caliber pistol found in his possession at the time of his arrest had
belonged to Walker. Id. Spring also admitted that he had been in Colorado in 1979 and
that Walker had been riding with Wagner and himself. Id. However, in response to
several questions during the interrogation, and specifically, to the question of whether
either he or Wagner had shot Walker, Spring replied "I'd rather not talk about that." Id.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that Spring's statement ofJuly 13, 1979, should
have been supressed because the officials conducting the investigation made no effort to
"reaffirm Spring's decision to waive his constitutional rights after he declined to answer
832 [Vol. 78
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court denied this motion,40 holding that the ATF agents' failure to
inform Spring before the March 30 interview that the questioning
would concern the Walker murder did not invalidate Spring's waiver
of his Miranda rights.4 1 However, the trial court did find that the
March 30 statement was irrelevant and thus not admissible at trial.42
The trial court determined that the May 26 statement "was made
freely, voluntarily, and intelligently, after [Spring's] being properly
and fully advised of his rights."' 43 As a result, the court admitted the
May 26 statement into evidence and subsequently convicted Spring
of first degree-murder. 44
On appeal, Spring claimed that the March 30 statement was in-
valid because it was obtained without prior notification that he
would be questioned about the Walker murder.45 Spring argued
that the May 26 statement should have been suppressed because it
was the illegal "fruit" of the March 30 statement.46
The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the March 30 state-
ment was invalid because the ATF agents failed to advise Spring
that he was a suspect in the Colorado murder or to advise him of his
Miranda rights before questioning him about the Walker murder.47
particular questions" or to establish that he did not intend to exercise his rights with
respect to the rest of the investigation. Id. at 878.
40 Spying, 107 S. Ct. at 854.
41 Id. The trial court held that "'the questions themselves suggested the topic of
inquiry... [and] were not designed to gather information relating to a subject that was
not readily evident or apparent to Spring.'" Id. (quoting People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865
(Colo. 1985), petition for cert. 4-A (No. 85-1517)). Spring knew the questioning con-
cerned the shooting of a man named Walker, and Spring had been fully advised of his
"'right to remain silent, his right to stop answering questions, and his right to have an
attorney present during the interrogation.'" The trial court found, however, that the
defendant chose not to exercise those rights. Id. (quoting People v. Spring, 713 P.2d
865 (Colo. 1985), petition for cert. 4-A (No. 85-1517)).
42 Id. The Court held that in the context of the questioning, the statement was not
sufficiently related to the Walker murder. Id. For the content of Spring's March 30,
1979 statement, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
43 Id. For the content of Spring's May 26, 1979 statement, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 26-30.
44 Id. at 855.
45 Id.
46 Id. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine provides that "evidence which is
spawned by or directly derived from an illegal search or an illegal interrogation is gener-
ally inadmissible against the defendant because of its original taint .... [A]n unlawful
search taints not only evidence obtained at the search, but facts discovered by process
initiated by the unlawful search." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 603 (5th'ed. 1979).
Spring claimed that because his confession of May 26 was the result of his invalid
statement of March 30, the May 26 confession was the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and
therefore, not admissible into evidence. Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 855.
47 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 855. Specifically, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that
"[the agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect, or to readvise him of his
19881 833
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As a result, the court held that Spring's waiver was not given "know-
ingly or intelligently.- 48 In reversing Spring's conviction and re-
manding the case for a new trial, the court ordered the state to
prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the prior
illegal statement of March 30.
49
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals on the grounds that the validity of the waiver of a
suspect's Miranda rights must be "determined upon the examination
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement to determine if the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. '" 50 The court held that Spring's lack of knowledge and
his lack of expectation as to the line of questioning regarding the
Walker murder were "determinative factors in undermining the va-
lidity of the waiver."51
In contradiction to the Colorado Supreme Court's holding, the
court's dissenting justices stated:
Law enforcement officers have no duty under Miranda to inform a
person in custody of all charges being investigated prior to question-
ing him. All that Miranda requires is that the suspect be advised that
he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be
used against him in court, that he has a right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer present during interrogation, and that if he can
not afford a lawyer one will be appointed to represent him.
52
The dissent accordingly rejected "the majority's conclusion that
Spring's waiver of his Miranda rights on March 30, 1979, was invalid
because he was not informed of all matters that would be
reviewed."53
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
a split in the circuits54 and to review the Colorado Supreme Court's
Miranda rights before questioning him about the murder." People v. Spring, 671 P.2d
965, 966 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
48 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 855.
49 Id.
50 People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 872-73 (Colo. 1985). The Colorado Supreme
Court held that no one factor is always conclusive in a determination of the validity of a
Miranda waiver. However, "to what extent, a suspect has been informed or is aware of
the subject matter of the interrogation prior to its commencement is simply one factor in
the court's evaluation of the total circumstances, although it may be a major or even a
determinative factor in some situations." Id.
51 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 855.
52 People v. Spring, 713 P.2d at 880 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 881 (Erickson,J., dissenting). The dissent found "ample evidence to support
the trial court's conclusion that Spring waived his Miranda rights." Id. (Erickson, J.,
dissenting).
54 Several federal courts of appeals have held that a suspect's prior knowledge of the
topics of interrogation is one factor to be considered in determining the validity of a
834 [Vol. 78
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decision that a suspect's prior knowledge of the possible subjects for
questioning is a relevant factor in determining whether Spring's
waivers of his Miranda rights and his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination were valid.55
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In Colorado v. Spring,56 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded the Colorado Supreme Court's decision,
holding that Spring's fifth amendment privilege had not been vio-
lated. Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion.57 Justice Pow-
ell stated that the Court's inquiry focused solely on the validity of
Spring's March 30 statement.58 Justice Powell explained that it was
the alleged illegality of this statement which purportedly tainted
Spring's May 26 confession.59
Initially, the majority examined the fifth amendment privilege
suspect's waiver of his fifth amendment privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Burger, 728
F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1984); Carter v. Garrison 656 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1981)(per
curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 952 (1982); United States v. McCray, 643 F.2d 323, 328
(5th Cir. 1981). Other federal courts of appeals have held that a suspect's prior knowl-
edge of the topics of interrogation is not a relevant factor in determining the validity of
the suspect's waiver of his fifth amendment privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Ander-
son, 533 F.2d 1210, 1212 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Campbell, 431 F.2d 97,
99 n.1 (9th Cir. 1970).
55 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 856. The Supreme Court granted certiorari only with respect
to the question of whether Spring's second statement of May 26 could be admitted into
evidence. Id. at 855 n.2. For an explanation of the Court's focus in Spring see infra note
58 and accompanying text.
56 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
57 Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Black-
mun, Stevens, O'Connor and Scalia.
58 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 856. Justice Powell stated that the Court focused on the
March 30 statement because the Colorado Supreme Court "held that the confession [of
May 26] should have been supressed because it was the illegal 'fruit' of the March 30
statement." Id. The Colorado Supreme Court stated in its opinion that the "attenua-
tion issue" of whether the May 26 statement is the "direct fruit" of the illegally obtained
March 30 statement is an issue for the trial court to resolve. Spring, 713 P.2d at 876.
Nonetheless, Justice Powell indicated that "[a] confession cannot be 'fruit of the poison-
ous tree' if the tree itself is not poisonous." Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 856. Thus, if Spring's
statement of March 30 was valid, then his confession of May 26, given after complete
Miranda warnings and notification that he was to be questioned about the Walker mur-
der, cannot be considered a tainted statement, i.e., poisonous fruit.
59 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 856. On its petition for a rehearing to the Colorado Supreme
Court, the State of Colorado argued for the first time that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), made the May 26 confession
an admissible statement independent of a determination of the validity of the March 30
statement. Id. at n.4. The Court concluded, however, that this question was not at issue
because the state would be free to assert this argument at trial on remand. Id. The
Colorado Supreme Court reached this same conclusion. Spring, 713 P.2d at 876 n.6.
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against self-incrimination 60 and its applicability to in-custody inter-
rogation. 61 Justice Powell noted that the procedural safeguards of
the Miranda warnings 62 were established to protect an individual's
ability to choose between silence and speech throughout the inter-
rogation process and that " 'without [these] proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused
of crime[s] contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he otherwise would not do so freely.' "63 The majority indi-
cated that the Miranda warnings were intended " 'to assure that the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remain un-
fettered throughout the interrogation process.' -64
The majority established that consistent with a suspect's privi-
lege against self-incrimination is the right to waive the fifth amend-
ment privilege if that waiver is done "'voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.' "65 In its analysis, the Spring majority followed the
waiver analysis established by the Court in Moran v. Burbine and sep-
arated the examination of a suspect's waiver into two distinct
inquiries. 6
6
Justice Powell identified the necessity of a "voluntary" waiver as
the first requirement for a valid Miranda waiver.67 Justice Powell es-
tablished a voluntary waiver as a waiver that is not the result of in-
timidation, coercion, or deception. 68 Applying this test to the Spring
facts, the majority found that Spring's waiver was clearly voluntary
60 For the text of the fifth amendment privilege, see supra note 8.
61 See Spring, 713 P.2d at 876. The Court in Miranda v. Arizona established that the
privilege against self-incrimination "is fully applicable during a period of custodial in-
terrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461. This privilege against self-incrimination is
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62 For the text of the Miranda warnings, see supra note 8.
63 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 856 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
64 Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469).
65 Id. at 857 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
66 Id. In Moran v. Burbine, the Court stated that:
First the relinquishment of the right [against self-incrimination] must have been
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made
with the full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.
106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986).
The Court also recognized that the waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights is valid
"only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension." Id. (quoting Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
67 See Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 857.
68 See id. See also Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
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because the record indicated that there was no allegation or finding
of coercion through physical violence or other deliberate means
used to break Spring's will.6 9 Justice Powell stated that the defend-
ant's claim that his waiver was not made voluntarily was based en-
tirely on his charge that the police did not supply him with certain
information.70 Justice Powell, however, noted that a simple failure
to supply information falls outside the traditional view of police
coercion.
71
The second requirement of a valid waiver, according to Justice
Powell, mandates that a waiver be given "knowingly and intelli-
gently."' 72 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he Constitution does not
require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible
consequence of a waiver of his fifth amendment privilege."
73
Rather, the majority noted that the Miranda warnings were intended
to ensure that a suspect knows his rights with respect to police inter-
rogation.74 Justice Powell indicated that a waiver of these rights is
knowingly and intelligently made if a suspect is fully advised of his
fifth amendment constitutional privilege.75 The majority held that
Spring's waiver of his fifth amendment privilege was made know-
ingly and intelligently because there was no allegation that Spring
failed to understand the Miranda warnings clearly given to him or
the consequences of his responding to police questioning.
76
Finally, the majority addressed Spring's claim that the ATF
agents' failure to inform him that he would be questioned about the
Walker murder constituted police "trickery." ' 77 Justice Powell stated
69 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 857. At trial, the court found specifically that " 'there was no
element of duress or coercion used to induce Spring's statements'" of March 30, 1978.
Id. (quoting People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1985), petition for cert. 3-A (No. 85-
1517)).
70 Id. The Colorado Supreme Court stated that whether the ATF agents told Spring
that they intended to question him about the firearms violations or whether they simply
began the questioning without disclosing the subjects of investigation was unclear. Id. at
858 n.7 (citing Sp'ing, 713 P.2d at 871). However, it was clear that the agents never
specifically told Spring that they intended to question him about the Walker homicide.
Id. at n.7.
71 Id. at 857. Traditionally, the Court has considered the effect of coercion in terms
of" 'the duration and conditions of detention .... the manifest attitude of the police
toward him [the suspect], his physical and mental state, [and] the diverse pressures
which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self control.' " Id. (quoting Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
72 See id.
73 Id. (citing Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 316-17 (1985)).
74 Id. at 857-58.
75 Id. at 858.
76 Id.
77 See id. The Court in Miranda v. Arizona stated that "any evidence that the accused
1988] 837
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that the Supreme Court has "never held that mere silence by law
enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is
'trickery' sufficient to invalidate a suspect's waiver of Miranda rights
and we expressly decline so to hold today." 78 Justice Powell also
noted that the Colorado courts made no finding of police
"trickery." 79
The majority asserted that once a suspect is given his Miranda
rights, official silence should not cause a suspect to misunderstand
those rights. 80 Justice Powell also noted that a valid waiver does not
require that a suspect be given all information that might affect his
decision to waive his rights.8 1 Justice Powell affirmed that " 'we
have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a
suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-in-
terest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.' "82 The
majority held that "additional information could affect only the wis-
dom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing
nature."83
Based upon the Court's findings that Spring voluntarily, know-
ingly, and intelligently waived his fifth amendment rights, the
Supreme Court held that the ATF agents' failure to inform Spring
was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will.., show that the defendant did not
voluntarily waive his privilege." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
78 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858. The Court has found that affirmative misrepresentations
by the police are sufficient to invalidate a suspect's waiver of his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). Justice Powell noted that Spring did not involve an
affirmative misrepresentation as to the scope of the interrogation, and thus, the Court
did not address the validity of a waiver in such a situation. Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858 n.8.
79 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858. The Colorado trial court found that although the ATF
agents did not specifically inform Spring that he would be questioned about the Colo-
rado homicide, " 'the questions themselves suggested the topic of inquiry.'" Id. at 858
n.7 (quoting People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1985),petition for cert. 4-A (No. 85-
1517)). The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that although it was unclear whether the
ATF agents specifically told the suspect that they wanted to question him about the
firearms violations or whether they simply began questioning him without disclosing the
topics of investigation, it was clear that the agents never informed Spring that they in-
tended to question him about the Walker murder. Spring, 713 P.2d at 871.
80 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858-59.
81 Id. at 859.
82 Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986)).
83 Id. Justice Powell noted in a footnote that any extension of Miranda to include a
requirement that a suspect be supplied with all available information which might affect
his waiver decision would cause "numerous problems of interpretation because any
number of factors could affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights." Id. at
n.9. Additionally, Justice Powell noted that such a requirement would also greatly limit
one of the Miranda rules' greatest virtues, namely, " 'informing police and prosecutors
with specificity' " how to conduct a pretrial custodial interview. Id. (quoting Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)).
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of the subject matter of the interrogation did not affect the validity
of his Miranda waiver.84 The Court accordingly reversed the Colo-
rado Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.8 5
V. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the
majority opinion. Justice Marshall essentially agreed with the Colo-
rado Supreme Court and concluded that because of the circum-
stances of the case the state did not meet the "heavy burden"
established in Miranda v. Arizona for proving the validity of Spring's
waiver of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6
Justice Marshall noted that consistent with the Court's prior de-
cisions, the majority accepted the requirement that the validity of a
suspect's Miranda waiver be determined from the "'totality of the
circumstances.' "87 Justice Marshall, however, rejected the major-
ity's holding that "the specific crimes and topics of investigation
known to the interrogating officers before questioning begins are
'not relevant' to, and in this case 'could not affect,' the validity of the
suspect's waiver."8 8 Instead, the dissent concluded that a suspect's
waiver of his Miranda rights would "necessarily [be] influenced by
his awareness of the scope and seriousness of the matters under
investigation." 8
9
Justice Marshall criticized the Court for determining that
knowledge of the topics of investigation" 'could only affect the wis-
dom of [the suspect's waiver],' as opposed to the validity of that
waiver." 90 The dissent stated that "wisdom and validity in this con-
text are overlapping concepts, as circumstances relevant to assess-
ing the validity of a waiver may also be highly relevant to its wisdom
in any given context." 9' Justice Marshall questioned how the Court,
under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, could conclude that
84 See id. at n.9.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 859 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court established in Miranda v. Arizona
that if an interrogation takes place "without the presence of an attorney, a heavy burden
rests upon the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
87 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 859 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 106
S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986)).
88 Id. at 859-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting majority opinion, at 859).
89 Id. at 860 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting at majority opinion, 107 S. Ct. at 859).
91 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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although the informing of a suspect that whatever he says may be
used against him in court is clearly relevant to a suspect's decision
to waive his Miranda rights, the knowledge of the specific crimes and
topics of investigation is never a relevant consideration in determin-
ing the validity of such a waiver.92
Justice Marshall also discussed the similarity between the
Court's holdings in Moran v. Burbine and in Spring.93 The dissent
noted that in Spring, the Court specifically avoided the question of
whether the lack of "any indication" as to the scope of questioning
is relevant in determining the validity of a supect's waiver of his fifth
amendment rights.
94
Justice Marshall concluded that a suspect's knowledge of the
crimes the police suspect him of committing and the line of ques-
tioning the police intend to pursue relevant information that the
suspect should possess, whether through an inference from the sur-
rounding circumstances of his arrest or from the officers involved.95
According to the dissent, a holding that such knowledge is relevant
information would not interfere with "legitimate interrogation tech-
niques" or with the police and prosecutors' understanding of how a
custodial interview should be conducted.
96
The dissent, moreover, criticized the police tactics used to ob-
tain Spring's confession to the Walker murder.97 In Justice Mar-
shall's opinion, Spring could not have anticipated questions about
the murder because the offense occurred in a different state and be-
cause the offense was a violation of a state law, which is normally
outside the investigative interests of the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms.
98
92 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority noted that in Moran, the Court held
"a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information 'use-
ful' in making his decision or all information that 'might . . . affec[t] his decision to
confess.'" Id. at 859 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1142). The Court in
Spring held that "a suspect's awareness of all possible subjects of questioning in advance
of interrogation is not relevant to determining" the validity of a suspect's waiver. Id.
94 See id. at 860 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that requiring officers to
inform a suspect of the crimes for which he is suspected of committing would "contrib-
ute significantly toward ensuring that the arrest was in fact lawful and the suspect's state-
ment was not compelled because of an error .... Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975).
97 See Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 860 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The interrogating officers
"hoped to obtain from Spring a valid confession to the federal firearms charge for which
he was arrested and then parlay this admission into a confession of first degree murder."
Id. at 860-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 861 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The dissent noted that interrogators consider the first admis-
sion in an interrogation as the "breakthrough" that will give police
tremendous tactical advantage. 99 Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he
coercive aspects of the psychological ploy intended in this case,
when combined with an element of suprise which may far too easily
rise to a level of deception, cannot be justified in light of Miranda's
requirement that waiver and confession be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent."' 00
The dissent interpeted the majority's holding in Spring to indi-
cate that a suspect's waiver of Miranda protections and agreement to
make a statement concerning a specific crime would validate such a
waiver with respect to questioning concerning any other crime.' 0
Justice Marshall indicated that such a situation was unfair to the sus-
pect because, once a waiver is given and a statement made, the pro-
tections of the Miranda rights against the "inherently compelling
pressures" of interrogation have disappeared and "[a]dditional
questioning about entirely separate and more serious suspicions of
criminal activity can take unfair advantage of the suspect's psycho-
logical state."' 1 2 The dissent thus concluded that a suspect's knowl-
edge of the topics of investigation are relevant in determining
whether a suspect's waiver of his fifth amendment privilege was
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 10 3 Finally, Justice
Marshall emphasized that the state's burden in proving the validity
of a suspect's waiver is a "heavy one"10 4 and that "every reasonable
presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights"
99 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 328
(1985)(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
100 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58, 475-76) (footnote
omitted). Justice Marshall noted that he joined Justice Steven's Moran v. Burbine dis-
sent which stated that" 'there can be no constitutional distinction... between a decep-
tive misstatement and the concealment by the police of the critical fact that an attorney
retained by the accused or his family has offered assistance ......."Id. at n. 1 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1158 (1986)(Stevens, J., dis-
senting)). Justice Marshall concluded that the failure to inform Spring about the sub-
jects of questioning was an equally critical concealed fact. Id. at n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
101 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that conducting unex-
pected questioning could cause "the compulsive pressures suddenly to reappear." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
103 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 The dissent concluded that the state would not be able to meet its burden in prov-
ing that Spring's waiver was given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently because of
the investigators' plan to first obtain Spring's confession to the federal firearms offense




should be made. 10 5
The dissent concluded that Spring would not have waived his
fifth amendment privilege without consulting an attorney had he
known that the topics of the interrogation would include the Walker
murder. 10 6 The dissent therefore joined with the Colorado
Supreme Court in concluding that Spring's waiver was not made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.'
0 7
VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Spring is one in a
long line of decisions attempting to restrain a suspect's fifth amend-
ment privilege.108 Although Miranda attempted to balance society's
need to deter and punish criminal activity with the need to protect
individual liberty and the privilege against self-incrimination, these
decisions have not been made easily and have been criticized and
challanged with great fervor.' 0 9 The Court's decision in Spring cor-
rectly concluded that a suspect's knowledge of the subjects of inter-
rogation is not relevant to a valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda
rights, but the majority essentially glossed over the sound policy
considerations for such a decision. Instead, the Court focused on
the basic requirements of Miranda and concluded that simple com-
pliance with these requirements was sufficient for a valid waiver.
The Court's opinion in Spring, though correct in its conclusion,
is lacking in two respects. First, the majority opinion in Spring did
not identify and address the policy considerations involved in this
case. Second, the majority failed to explore the issue of whether
105 Id. at 861 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)).
106 Id. at 861-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 862 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108 Many commentators feel that the Burger Court acted to severely limit a suspect's
rights established under Miranda. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 370 (1979); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 649 (1974). See
Machlis, Criminal Procedure II: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1985 ANN. SURV. OF
AM. L. 289 (1985); Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 405 (1982); Grossman & Lane, Miranda: The Erosion of a Doctrine, 62
CHI. B. REC. 250 (1980).
109 For discussions criticizing the Court's application of the Miranda doctrine, see
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987); Broome, 'You (Might)
have a Right to Remain Silent.. .', 7 CAL. LAw. 37 (March 1987); Grossman & Lane, supra
note 108. For discussions calling for the overruling of the Miranda v. Arizona decision,
see Caplan, supra note 12; Frey, Modem Police Interrogation Law: The Wrong Road Taken, 42
U. PrTr. L. REV. 731 (1981); Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65
VA. L. REV. 859 (1979). For a discussion supporting the Miranda decision, see White,
Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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silence regarding the topics of investigation can constitute trickery
and therefore invalidate an otherwise voluntary waiver.
The Court has never accepted the notion that a waiver is valid
simply because the required Miranda warnings have been given. 1 0
Instead, the Court has required that a suspect must relinquish his
privilege voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."' The primary
purpose for establishing the Miranda warnings was "to dissipate the
compulsion inherent in a custodial interrogation and, in so doing,
guard against abridgement of the suspect's fifth amendment
rights." 1 2 At the same time, however, the Miranda Court had to
address the interest of society in preventing crime.'1
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Moran v.
Burbine114 that a waiver is valid as a matter of law if the waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege is given "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently."' 15 In Spring, the Court found that the defendant's waiver of
his fifth amendment privilege was voluntarily 1 6 made and that his
waiver, furthermore, was given knowingly and intelligently. 1 7 Ac-
cordingly, the Spring Court held that the law enforcement officers'
failure to advise Spring of the subject matter of the investigation
110 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 476.
111 See id. at 444.
112 Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143 (1986).
113 See id. at 1144. The Court stated that "[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely
'desirable,' they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting and
punishing those who violate the law." Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 431
U.S. 181, 186 (1977)). In Miranda, the Court stated that "[c]onfessions remain a proper
element in law enforcement." 384 U.S. at 478.
114 106 S. Ct. 1135.
115 Id. at 1142 (emphasis added). The Court stated that:
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was un-
coerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and
that he was aware of the state's intention to use his statements to secure his convic-
tion, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
116 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 857. "Absent evidence that Spring's 'will [was] overborne and
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired' because of coercive police con-
duct, his waiver of his fifth amendment privilege was voluntary .... ." Id. (quoting
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). Spring claimed "no 'coercion of a
confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break [his] will,'
and the trial court found none." Id. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312
(1985)). See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
117 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 857. The Court found that "Spring understood that he had a
right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence against him."
Id. The Spring majority also stated that Spring made no allegation that he failed to un-
derstand his constitutional privilege or the consequences of speaking with the officers.
Id. at 858. In fact, Spring's only challenge to the validity of his waiver was based on his
claim that his statement was not made voluntarily because he was tricked or deceived as
a result of the police officers' failure to inform him of the intended scope of their investi-
gation. Id. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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"could not affect Spring's decision to waive his fifth amendment
privilege in a constitutionally significant manner." 118
Although the dissent in Spring never specifically claimed that
Spring's waiver was not given knowingly or intelligently," 9 Justice
Marshall did focus on the voluntariness of the suspect's waiver as a
consequence of the Miranda Court's concern for protecting the sus-
pect from the "inherently compelling pressures of ... custodial in-
terrogation." 120 The dissent, however, failed to recognize that the
warnings provided Spring went beyond the requirements for pro-
tecting the suspect's rights because the officers advised Spring that
he had a right to stop the questioning at any time. 12' This fact is
significant because it supports the contention that Spring's will was
not overburdened. If Spring felt uncomfortable when the officers
began discussing the murder, he was well aware of the fact that he
had the ability and the right to stop the interrogation at that
point. 122 Thus, considering Spring's understanding of his rights, it
is difficult to say that Spring's waiver was made voluntarily and that
the officers did not adequately protect the suspect's constitutional
rights.
A. THE OTHER POLICY CONCERN OF MIRANDA: A LOOK AT LAW
ENFORCEMENT
The United States Supreme Court correctly concluded in Colo-
rado v. Spring that a suspect need not be informed of the intended
subjects of interrogation prior to making a valid Miranda waiver, but
essentially ignored the Miranda Court's concern for maintaining a
strong system of law enforcement and criminal prosecution.
Though the dissent in Spring focused on the policy concern in Mi-
118 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 859.
119 The dissent did question how, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the
majority could claim that informing a suspect that "whatever he says may be used
against him" is a relevant factor for determining the validity of a waiver but that a sus-
pect's knowledge of the topics of investigation is not relevant. Id. at 860 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent overlooked the fact that the Court's decision in Miranda requires that a
suspect be advised of the fact that his statements can later be used against him at trial.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. The Miranda Court, however, did not require that a suspect be
advised of the subjects of interrogation or even of all topics which may affect the wisdom
of the suspect's decision to make a waiver of his Miranda rights.
120 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 861 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
121 See People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 881 (Colo. 1985) (Erickson,J., dissenting). For
the content of the Miranda warnings, see supra note 8.
122 The fact that Spring had spent time in prison is also important to the analysis. See
Brief for Petitoner at 3, Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987). Spring's background




randa of protecting the suspect from the inherently compelling pres-
sures of interrogation as a basis for invalidating Spring's waiver, the
Spring majority failed to address Miranda's alternative policy con-
cern: the interest of society in a strong system of criminal justice.
This interest is also compelling and clearly supports the decision in
Spring.
In Miranda, the Court was concerned not only with protecting
the individual's rights, it was also mindful of the important function
the police play in maintaining law and order.123 The Moran Court
recognized these conflicting concerns and identified the "subtle bal-
ance" in Miranda:
On the one hand, "the need for police questioning as a tool for
effective law enforcement of criminal laws" cannot be doubted. Ad-
missions of guilt are more than "merely desirable," they are essential
to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting and punishing
those who violate the law. On the other hand, the Court has recog-
nized that the interrogation process is "inherently coerceive" and that,
as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will
inadvertently traverse a fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit ad-
missions and constitutionally impermissible compulsions. 124
As a result of society's concern for maintaining law and order,
the Miranda Court was careful not to overburden the police in their
law enforcement efforts. 125 However, what the dissent proposed in
Spring, that a suspect be informed of the subjects of interrogation
prior to questioning, 126 would certainly place an additional burden
123 As the Court stated in Miranda:
This Court, while protecting individual rights, has always given ample latitude to
law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties. The limits we
have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interfer-
ence with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does
not in any way preclude the police from carrying out their traditional investigatory
functions.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481.
124 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1144 (citations omitted).
125 In an effort to protect the role of the police in our society, the Court stated in
Miranda that "[t]he limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not cause
an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
481.
The Moran Court, in reaffirming that the police should not be overburdened in the
performance of their duties, stated that "[b]ecause neither the letter nor the purpose of
Miranda require this additional handicap on otherwise permissible investigatory efforts,
we are unwilling to expand the Miranda rules to require the police to keep the suspect
abreast of the status of his legal representation." Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1144.
126 The dissentingJustices in Spring would require "the officers to articulate at a mini-
mum the crime or crimes for which the suspect was arrested." Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 860
(emphasis added). However, this was not at issue in Spring. In Spring, the question
before the Court was whether knowledge of the subjects of interrogation is a relevant factor
for the Court to consider in determining the validity of the suspect's waiver. Id. at 856.
The question of whether the police should inform the defendant of the suspected crimes
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on law enforcement. This additional requirement is not called for
by the Miranda decision, would upset the careful balance established
by the Miranda Court, and would interfere with effective law
enforcement.
First, the Court's decision in Miranda "was painstakingly spe-
cific in listing the basic constitutional rights which the police must
propound to a suspect before questioning."' 127 Nowhere in the Mi-
randa decision is there any indication that a suspect should be pro-
vided with all the information in the possession of the police. The
Court, moreover, has refused in the past to expand the Miranda re-
quirements to include a mandatory requirement that a suspect be
provided with all available information.
128
Second, a requirement that the police inform a suspect of all
possible subjects of interrogation would greatly interfere with the
police in the performance of their duties. One of the greatest vir-
tues and principle advantages of Miranda has been "the ease and
clarity of its application." 1 29 As the Court stated in Fare v. Michael
C., "Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing police and prose-
cutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custo-
dial interrogation .... ,,130 If the police were forced to consider the
individual circumstances in each and every interrogation, the intent
of the Miranda decision would be defeated.1 3 1 The police could no
longer be confident that the suspect's constitutional rights had been
preserved and that the suspect's waiver was truly valid because there
for which he has been arrested may be an easier question than the issue in Spring. The
police will presumably know why the suspect was arrested but may not be familiar with
all the potential areas of investigation prior to the questioning. See infra text accompany-
ing note 133.
127 Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 738-39 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877 (1974).
128 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986), in which the Court stated:
[A] rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact
him would contribute to the protection of the fifth amendment privilege only inci-
dently, if at all. This minimal benefit, however, would come at a substantial cost to
society's legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt.
Id. at 1144.
129 Id. at 1143. See also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984); Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 705, 718 (1979); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1974).
130 Fare, 442 U.S. at 718. The Fare Court also explained that Miranda has the virtue of
"informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interroga-
tion are not admissible." Id.
131 As the Miranda Court stated: "Our decision is not intended to hamper the tradi-
tional function of the police officers in investigating crime." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
The Supreme Court later reaffirmed in Moran that the Court was "unwilling to mod-
ify Miranda in [a] manner that would so clearly undermine the decision's central 'virtue
of informing the police and prosecutors with specificity . . .what they may do in con-
ducting a custodial interrogation.'" Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1143 (quoting Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. at 718).
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would not be an established standard by which the police could
judge the propriety of their conduct. The legitimacy of police con-
duct would continually be questioned, even in cases such as Spring,
in which the police went beyond the required warnings in guarding
the suspect's rights. 1
32
There are also practical considerations to contemplate. As Jus-
tice Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court stated in dissent:
Prior to questioning a suspect, the police may have insufficient
information to determine what charges will ultimately be filed against
him. The nature of the offense may depend upon circumstances un-
known to the police, such as whether the suspect has a criminal record.
It may also turn upon an event yet to occur, such as whether the victim
of the crime dies.' 33
If the interrogating officers were forced to provide the suspect
with the topics of questioning prior to the interrogation, the officers
would have to determine what charges were to be brought against
the suspect. This question, however, is normally outside the police
officers' expertise and training and may be outside the realm of their
knowledge. 134 Such a requirement would be impractical and unreal-
istic. An obvious problem also arises if the suspect reveals informa-
tion about additional offenses during the interrogation. The police
should not be required to stop the questioning and advise the sus-
pect that he will be questioned about a new offense or remind the
suspect of his Miranda rights. Any requirement that the interrogat-
ing officers inform the suspect of all possible topics of investigation
or reissue the warnings at each turn in the interrogation would be
unworkable and would interfere with the traditional duties of law
enforcement officials.
Finally, a requirement that the police disclose all the topics of
interrogation prior to obtaining a valid waiver might well be ex-
tended to force the police to disclose any possible relevant informa-
tion.135 Such a requirement would clearly be an added burden on
the police and might well conflict with police operations. As the
Department of Justice stated in its amicus curiae brief,
a miscalculation in either direction could prove costly: if he [a police
132 See supra text accompanying note 121.
'33 People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 881 (Colo. 1985) (Erickson, J., dissenting).
134 The arresting officers would know on what charge the suspect was arrested, but
the officers may not know the crime or crimes for which the suspect will ultimately be
prosecuted.
135 Prior to obtaining a valid Miranda waiver, the police might be required to disclose
any physical evidence they had obtained against the suspect, whether there were any
witnesses to the crime, the condition of the victim, and whether any other suspects in the
crime had been arrested or had given a statement.
1988] 847
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
officer] erred in failing to supply the information, any confession he
obtained would have to be suppressed; if he erred on the side of cau-
tion, his action could needlessly discourage the making of a statement
and thwart successful investigation of a serious crime.
136
As a result, the police would have to make a careful ad hoc inquiry,
of the relevant circumstances surrounding every suspect's arrest
before a confession or a statement could be obtained. Requiring
such an analysis would clearly place an unjustifiable burden on the
police in the performance of his duties.
B. IS SILENCE TRICKERY?
The United States Supreme Court correctly concluded in Colo-
rado v. Spring that police nondisclosure of the subjects of investiga-
tion does not constitute the kind of "trickery" that would invalidate
a suspect's waiver within the meaning of the Court's decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona. The Court stated in Miranda that "any evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver, will
... show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privi-
lege." ' 37 The dissent relied on this statement in Miranda in an effort
to demonstrate that Spring's waiver was not made voluntarily but
was the result of trickery due to the failure of the police to inform
Spring of the topics of interrogation prior to questioning. 138
In determining whether a suspect's waiver is voluntary, the
Court has traditionally examined whether the interrogation was co-
ercive.' 39 The Supreme Court has previously held that affirmative
misrepresentations by the police can be coercive or deceptive and
can invalidate a suspect's waiver. 140 The Court, however, has never
specifically defined the activities that constitute trickery within the
meaning of Miranda.'4 ' Nor has the Court, prior to its decision in
Spring, addressed the issue of whether a failure to supply a suspect
136 Brief Amicus Curiae (United States Department ofJustice) for Petitioner at 23, Colo-
rado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987)(No. 85-1517).
137 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
138 See Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858; Id. at 861 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139 Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986)("[t]he sole concern of the fifth
amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion"). See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 460. See also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
140 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858 n.8. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
141 See White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 583 (1979).
Professor White's article identifies and evaluates several interrogation methods which
may be considered trickery. Id. at 601-28. These methods include: (a) deception about
whether an interrogation is taking place; (b) deception that distorts the meaning of the
Miranda warnings; (c) deception that distorts the seriousness of the crime;
(d) assumption of nonadversary roles by interrogating officers; (e) tricks that take on the
character of threats or promises; (f) repeated assurances that the suspect is known to be
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with the subject matter of the interrogation before commencing the
questioning constitutes "trickery." 
1 42
In Moran v. Burbine, however, the Court indicated that any in-
vestigation into the circumstances of a suspect's waiver must focus
on whether the suspect was tricked in such a manner that he did not
understand or was unable to exercise his constitutional rights. 143 In
Moran, the Court held that the failure of the polices to inform the
defendant of a telephone call from his attorney was not "the kind of
'trickery' that can vitiate the validity of a waiver."144 The Moran
Court reasoned that although the defendant would probably want to
know that an attorney had attempted to communicate with him,
such information was not required under Miranda.145 The Moran
guilty; and (g) the "Mutt and Jeff" routine, also known as "good guy, bad guy." Id. See
also, Note, Police Use of Tickery as an Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1979).
Some state courts have indicated that the test for determining whether a particular
police tactic is trickery should be based on whether the interrogation method used is
likely to produce an untrue statement, thereby leading an innocent person to make an
untrue confession. See D. NIssMAN, E. HAGEN, & P. BROOKS, LAW OF CONFESSIONS 22
(1985)(citing, Annot., 99 A.L.R.2D 772, 777 (1979)); see also White, supra, at 581. White,
however, notes that this test is not completely consistent with prior Supreme Court
holdings. White suggests that the Court has ruled that a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis must demonstrate that "the suspect's statement was 'the product of his free and
rational choice.'" Id. at 583 (quoting Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521
(1968)(per curiam)). White also notes, that the Court has held, certain interrogation
methods are so coercive that their use results in an" 'involuntary' confession as a matter
of law, irrespective of the likelihood that they did or could produce a false confession."
Id. at 583-84 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944)(holding that con-
tinuous interrogation for thirty-six consecutive hours was "so inherently coercive that its
very existence is irreconcilable with the possesion of mental freedom")).
142 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858. In Spring, the Court only cursorily addressed this issue by
stating that "[t]his Court has never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as
to the subject matter of an interrogation is 'trickery' sufficient to invalidate a suspect's
waiver of Miranda rights and we expressly decline to so hold today." Id. (footnote omit-
ted).
A number of lower courts have addressed the issue of the effect of silence on the
validity of a suspect's waiver in the situation in which the interrogators fail to advise the
suspect of all possible charges against him, and these courts have concluded that such
activity will not invalidate a suspect's waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Burger, 728 F.2d
140 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Harris v.
Riddle, 551 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1977); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Campbell, 431 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1970).
143 Moran, 106 S. Ct at 1142. The Moran Court found that even:
[giranting that the 'deliberate or reckless' withholding of information is objectiona-
ble as a matter of ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional validity
of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to under-
stand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.
Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. The Moran Court stated that "we have never read the Constitution to require
the police to supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self
interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights." Id. (citing Oregon v. El-
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Court, concluded therefore, that the defendant's waiver was valid
because the defendant made a voluntary decision to speak to the
police "with full awareness and comprehension of all information
Miranda requires the police to convey." 146 Thus it appears from the
Court's decision in Moran that a failure to disclose useful informa-
tion is not trickery if the withholding of such information does not
interfere with the suspect's ability to exercise his Miranda rights.
Applying the logic of Moran, a failure to disclose the subject
matter of questioning should not invalidate Spring's waiver. In
Spring, there was "no allegation that Spring failed to understand the
basic privilege guaranteed by the fifth amendment [n]or... that he
misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the law en-
forcement officials." 14 7 Thus, although Spring may have been de-
nied access to useful information, the lack of such information did
not interfere with the exercise of his constitutional rights. 148 Ac-
cordingly, the failure of the police to provide Spring with informa-
tion concerning the subject matter of the investigation should not
be considered the "kind of trickery that can vitiate the validity of a
waiver." 14
9
Furthermore, because the question of trickery in Spring involved
a failure to provide the suspect with information which could not
affect his decision to exercise his rights under Miranda, the suspect
was unharmed in a constitutionally significant manner. Thus the
question of trickery is not an issue. 150 Moreover, as the Department
stad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1297-98 (1985); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188
(1977)). Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985) (the Court stated "[w]e have
never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant
with information about parol eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be
voluntary .... "); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970)) (the Court stated
that a defendant's "decision to plead guilty or not turns on whether he thinks the law
will allow his confession to be used against him" and that a mistaken assessment as to
the admissibility of his confession because of erroneous advice as to the applicable law,
does not make his plea an involuntary act).
146 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
147 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858.
148 As the Court stated in Spring, "the additional information [concerning the subjects
of investigation] could only affect the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially
voluntary and knowing nature." Id. at 859.
149 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142. As the Court established in Moran, withholding infor-
mation "is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defend-
ant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature and the consequence
of abandoning [his rights]." Id.
150 This situation can be contrasted with a case in which a suspect receives false infor-
mation regarding, for example, the seriousness of the matter under investigation. Be-
cause a suspect must be able to reassert his Miranda rights at any point during an
interrogation, once a waiver is given, a misrepresentation of the seriousness of the crime
interferes with the suspect's ability to assess the desirabilty of asserting his Miranda
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ofJustice's amicus curiae brief highlights: "[t]he limits upon a police
officer's obligation to provide information to a suspect would be
meaningless if the failure to supply extraneous information could
constitute deception that vitiates a suspect's waiver.''151 Because
the information concerning the subjects of questioning could not
affect Spring's waiver decision in a constitutionally significant man-
ner, the withholding of such information should not constitute
"trickery" within the meaning of Miranda.'52
VII. CONCLUSION
In Colorado v. Spring, the United States Supreme Court refused
to require the police to supply a suspect with information concern-
ing the subjects of investigation prior to the obtainment of a valid
waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights. According to the Court, such
information was not needed for a constitutionally valid waiver of the
suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
could not affect the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent nature of
such a decision.'
53
The Court's decision in Spring supports legitimate law enforce-
ment efforts and recognizes that suspect confessions are often cru-
cial to criminal investigations. As the Court stated in Culombe v.
Connecticut:
Despite modem advances in the technology of crime detection,
offenses frequently occur about which things can not be made to
speak. And where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to
such offenses, nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be
balked before it has fairly begun-but to seek out possibly guilty wit-
nesses and ask them questions.'
54
The Court's decision in Colorado v. Spring maintains the balance
sought by the Miranda Court. Though the majority opinion in Spring
rights. See White, supra note 141, at 613. According to Professor White, a misrepresen-
tation concerning the seriousness of the crimes under investigation "achieves as perni-
cious an effect as direct distortion of the Miranda warnings." Id.
The Court has ruled in prior decisions that a suspect may be coerced or tricked if
presented with false information. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (de-
fendant's confession not valid because of police officer's false statements that defendant
would be denied financial aid for her children if she failed to cooperate with the police).
The Court in Spring specifically chose not to rule on the question of whether affirmative
misrepresentations as to the subject matter of an interrogation would invalidate a Mi-
randa waiver. See Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 858 n.8.
151 Brief Amicus Curiae (United States Department of Justice) at 25, Spring (No. 85-
1517).
152 See Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 859. See also text accompanying notes 147-49.
153 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 859.
154 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961).
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did not specifically address society's interest in preventing crime
and the value to society of obtaining a suspect's confession, the
Spring decision effectively preserves the critical balance between
protecting individual liberties and maintaining an effective system of
law enforcement.
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